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order setting aside a general verdict of a jury and granting a new trial.
Thus, the action of the Ohio General Assembly in amending the Ap-
pellate Procedure Act was in line with the general trend throughout
the country.
It seems unfortunate that the Supreme Court of this state, in the
light of the widespread tendency to enact legislation of the kind under
consideration and in the light of the proven benefits derived therefrom,
should have seen fit to take such a narrow and formal view of the con-
stitutional provision. The effect of the decision is to place Ohio appel-
late procedure in a virtual straight-jacket by insisting that the definition
of the term final order be confined to those orders which have in the
past been recognized as final. The right of a successful party to a
judgment on the verdict which has been rendered in his favor would
certainly seem to be a substantial right which, when finally determined,
might fairly be deemed to be a final determination of the party's right
to that verdict. If it could reasonably be considered as such, the legisla-
ture ought to have the power to call it a final order and bring it within
the realm of the appellate court's procedure. The action of the General
Assembly in so doing need not have been considered as enlarging the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, for it merely provided by law for
the exercise of jurisdiction already conferred.
While the Supreme Court deplores the treatment of the term
"judgments" in a limited sense, 9 it has itself given that term a greatly
restricted meaning in narrowing the definition of final order.
GEORGE A. WARP,
Western Reserve University,
Department of Political Science.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE
CHATTEL MORTGAGES- IS THE MORTGAGEE PROTECTED BY
THE RECORDING ACT?
In two recent lower court cases the question of priority of a recorded
chattel mortgage has been under consideration. In the first case the
defendant was the chattel mortgagee of an automobile sold to one James
Goltie. The mortgage was duly filed in the recorder's office. While
such mortgage was on file, Goltie purchased four tires from the plaintiff
under a conditional sale agreement. The new tires were placed on the
mortgaged car by the plaintiff and the conditional sale agreement was
" Hoffman v. Knollman, 13S Ohio St. 170, 176-79, zo N.E. (zd) zz (x939).
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properly filed. Goltie defaulted in payments due the defendant and the
car was repossessed. The plaintiff brought an action to recover for the
value of the tires. The court held that the recording of the chattel
mortgage on the car gave the plaintiff constructive notice of the defend-
ant's prior claim and that no lien on the tires superior to the defendant's
was acquired. Goodrich Silvertown Stores v. F. M. RZugg Motor Co.,
28 Ohio L. Abs. 206 (I939).
In the second case the plaintiff was the mortgagee of an automobile
of which one Helen Kehnert was mortgagor. Prior to the purchase of
the car and the filing of the mortgage, Helen Kehnert had moved into
a suite in the defendant's hotel. Sometime later she left the hotel owing
a balance on her account of $289. She left the mortgaged car in the
hotel garage. Because of default in payments due on the car, the
plaintiff filed an action of replevin for the car. The defendant answered
alleging that it had been impressed with an innkeeper's lien upon the
said automobile by reason of provisions of Ohio G.C.-sec. 5984. The
court held that an innkeeper's lien takes priority over that of a previously
recorded chattel mortgage. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Kehnert, 28 Ohio L. Abs. 208, 13 Ohio 0. 244 (1939).
The two cases are of interest because they present fact situations in
which constructive notice usually given by the recording of chattel
mortgages is found ineffective as a protection to the mortgagees. It is a
fundamental rule of mortgage law that a prior recorded mortgage will
prevail over all subsequent mortgages and liens asserted against the same
property. This recording rule is found both in the law of real property
mortgages and in the law of chattel mortgages. By force of the real
property recording acts, a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee takes
subject to a duly recorded mortgage, as affected with constructive
notice thereof. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed.) Vol. 3, p. 2559.
In the field of personal property the filing of a chattel mortgage accord-
ing to the statute providing therefor furnishes constructive notice to
subsequent lienors or mortgagees of rights conferred upon prior parties
by such instrument. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, p. 488.
In jurisdictions outside of Ohio under facts similar to those in the
Goodrich case, where the tire vendor has retained title to the tires placed
on the mortgaged car through the device of a conditional sale or chattel
mortgage, the cases have held that the doctrine of accession does not
apply so as to pass tide in the tires to the car mortgagee. Clark v. WVells,
45 Vt. 4, 12 Am. Rep. 187 (1872), the leading case; Bosquet v. Mack
Motor Truck Co., 269 Mass. 200, 168 N.E. 8oo (1929); Snyder v.
Aker, 134 Misc. 721, 236 N.Y.S. 28 (1929); Clarke v. Johnson,
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43 Nev. 359, 187 Pac. 510 (1920); Motor Credit Co. v. Smith, 181
Ark. 127, 24 S-.W (2d) 974 (1930); 68 A.L.R. 1242. The usual
theory is that if tide is retained by the tire vendor, the tires do not become
such an inseverable part of the car so as to pass tide to the car mortgagee.
But in the cases where the tire vendor has not retained title in himself,
the courts have consistently applied the doctrine of accession and held
that the tires became a component part of the car and tide to the tires is
regarded as vested in the car mortgagee. Blackwood Tire and Vulcan-
izing Co. v. Auto Storage Co., 133 Tenn. 515, 182 S.W. 576, L.R.A.
I9 16E 254, Ann. Cas. I91 7 C i168 (1916); Diamond Service Sta-
tion v. Broadway Motor Co., I58 Tenn. 258, 12 S.W. (2d) 705
(1929); Purnell v. Fooks, 32 Del. 336, 122 Ad. 9O1 (1923); Sprit-
zer v. Rutgers Chevrolet Co., 12 N.J. Misc. 782 (I934); 68 A.L.R.
1245.
The Ohio cases follow the general rule that a recorded chattel
mortgage does not cover after acquired accessories easily severed from
the chattel where tide to such accessories has been reserved in the
vendor. A mortgage covering a "string of tools" used for drilling oil
has been held not to cover after acquired appliances attached to the
mortgaged property when title to the appliances was reserved in the
vendor. Nerzorg v. National Supply Co., 18 Ohio C.D. 112, 7 Ohio
C.C. (N.S.) 461 (1905). A conditional vendor of a radio attached to
a mortgaged car has been allowed recovery from the car mortgagee.
Mechanic v. Schaeffer, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 129, 7 Ohio 0. 505 (I937).
A tire vendor retaining title by means of a chattel mortgage has been
allowed recovery from a car mortgagee. Rite Credit Tire Co. v. A. B.
Wfiliams Auto Sales Co., io Ohio L. Abs. 428 (I931). Recovery has
been allowed by a tire vendor retaining title in itself where it had no
knowledge that the tires were to be placed on a mortgaged car. Conti-
nental Finance Co. v. Gold Seal Tire Co., 6 Ohio L. Abs. 26 (1927).
In the Rite Credit Company case, supra, the tire vendor had constructive
notice of the car mortgage when it placed the tires on the car.
The judge in the Goodrich case stresses the constructive notice
given by the recording. The Rite Credit Company case is criticized and
two cases involving artisan's liens are cited and followed for the propo-
sition that the recording of the mortgage gave constructive notice to all
subsequent lienors. Metropolitan Securities Co. v. Orlow, 107 Ohio St.
583, 14o N.E. 3o6, 32 A.L.R. 992 (1923); Kellar v. Evans, 14
Ohio App. 265, 31 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 545 (1920). Such reliance is
unwarranted. The Goodrich case can be distinguished on its facts from
those cases in as much as the tires can be easily severed from the car
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while such is not the case where permanent repairs have been made.
The Goodrich case, therefore, is clearly out of line, not only with the
prevailing view in other jurisdictions, but also with the view of the Ohio
cases.
In the Kehnert case, supra, the other principal case, where the con-
test was between the chattel mortgagee of a car and a hotel impressing an
innkeeper's lien, the court found an exception to the rule of priority
from filing the mortgage. Since the relationships of the parties are
comparable, following the analogy of the law giving a recorded chattel
mortgage priority over subsequent artisan's liens, it seems that the
recording rule might have been applied without exception so as to per-
mit the car mortgagee to prevail. The innkeeper's lien, however, has
from early times in the common law been favored by the courts. This
was because of his obligation to receive all travelers and because of the
extraordinary responsibility of the innkeeper for the goods brought in
the inn. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, p. 495. At common law the
lien extended not only to the guest's own goods but also to goods of a
third person and even to stolen goods. It has been held that the fact
that the innkeeper knew that the property belonged to a third person
did not deprive him of his lien, as for example, where the goods consist
of sample trunks of a traveling salesman. 14 R.C.L. 54o. Thus, it
seems, that under the common law rules governing innkeeper's liens,
the decision in the Kehnert case is correct and the hotel should be
entitled to impress an innkeeper's lien on the mortgaged car even though
constructive notice of the mortgagee's rights was given by the recording.
Today the innkeeper's lien is almost universally regulated by statute.
The Ohio General Code, sec. 5984, allows the innkeeper a lien on the
"baggage and other property in and about the inn belonging to or under
the control of his guests." This statute has been interpreted as being
declaratory of the common law and such is the rule today. Thoma v.
Remington Typewriter Co., 20 Ohio C.D. 691, II Ohio C.C. (N.S.)
174 (19o8); Cooperider v. Myre, 37 Ohio App. 502, 505, 175 N.E.
235, 236 (930); M. & M. Hotel Co. v. Nichols, 21 Ohio L. Abs.
66, 68, 5 Ohio 0. 387, 388 (935). Thus, an innkeeper has been
allowed a lien on a typewriter brought into the hotel by a guest who
had acquired it by false pretenses. Thoma v. Remington Typewriter
Co., supra.
Although the judge in the Kehnert case, feeling bound by the doc-
trine of stare decisis, gives the innkeeper a lien on the mortgaged car,
he does so reluctantly. In dictum he takes issue with the Ohio view
that the statute is declaratory of the common law and says that the
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evident intent of the legislature was not to subject the property of
wholly innocent persons to such a lien. He further contends that the
words "under control of" cannot mean other people's property under
the control of the guest, but rather property belonging to the guest
under the control of the guest. The judge stresses the fact that the
extraordinary protection afforded the innkeeper at common law is no
longer necessary since his responsibility for a guest's goods has been
greatly modified by other statutes. Ohio G.C. sections 5981, 5982,
5983. These specifically limit the innkeeper's responsibility. Thus,
since the reason for the common law rule giving the innkeeper extra-
ordinary protection has ceased to exist, it seems that the rule itself should
be discarded. A more just rule would protect chattel mortgagees who
have given constructive notice of their prior rights by filing as provided
in the recording act. PHILIP AULTMAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
LEGISLATIVE SUCCOR FOR THE MOTOR CAR DEALER'
Recent years have heard from all sides the cry of overcrowding in
business, of unfair competitive practices, and of ruinous competition. The
retail end of the motor car industry has been no exception. Conspicuous
among its troubles have been the competition of the fly-by-night seller in
the sale of new cars, and of the finance companies in the sale of repos-
sessed and rebuilt cars, the junk dealers, the abuse of automobile financ-
ing, price cutting through the devices of dumping and excessive trade-in
allowances, the traffic in stolen cars, and the bootlegging of cars from
other states. But back of these tribulations lies the fact that various
economic factors have spawned a host of automobile dealers, the conse-
quences of which have been a large percentage of failures and a very
low margin of net profit.' Studies of the Research Division of the
N. R. A. reveal that at the end of 1934, there were Io6,ooo automobile
retail outlets in the United States, with the average dealer grossing
between $3o,ooo and $5o,ooo yearly.2 Forty-two per cent of all
dealers sold less than fifteen cars per year, forty per cent between fifteen
and seventy-five and less than eighteen per cent over seventy-five.3 The
" Clark, "Make Money Little Businessman or Else," The Saturday Evening Post,
July 30, 1938, at 23.
U. S. National Recovery Adm., Evidence Studies, So Preliminary Draft zz.
a lid at 23. It is very improbable that dealers selling less than fifteen cars annually
will show a profit. Yet incidental and overhead expenses increase only slightly with the
increase in the number of cars sold and by eliminating the sub-marginal dealer a substan-
tial profit would be available to those remaining.
